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• ISS and Space Shuttle Trajectory Operations
• The challenge: A post-docking conjunction
• Space Shuttle rendezvous profile
• The solution as flown for STS-132
• Best practices and lessons learned
Overview
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• Both ISS and Space Shuttle have their own Mission 
Control teams responsible for the operations of their 
vehicles.
• Space Shuttle Flight Dynamics Officer (“FDO”)
– Responsible for the trajectory of the Space Shuttle 
including:
• Orbit determination
• Ephemeris modelling
• Maneuver targeting (orbit insertion, 
rendezvous, and deorbit)
• Contingency planning
• Conjunction evaluation
– Supported by a team of navigators and trajectory 
phase specialists
• ISS Trajectory Operations and Planning Officer 
(“TOPO”)
– Responsible for the trajectory of the ISS including:
• Orbit determination
• Ephemeris modelling
• Maneuver planning (reboost)
• Conjunction evaluation
• Contingency planning
Mission Control Center Trajectory Operations
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• Both TOPO and FDO work with the Department of Defense (DoD)Joint Space 
Operations Center (JSpOC) to identify potential conjunctions between the ISS 
or Shuttle and space debris
• Process:
– The trajectory(actual and predicted) for the Shuttle is provided to the DoD
• The DoD uses their own tracking of the ISS
– If an object is within a certain distance of the Shuttle or ISS, the DoD
notifies the FDO/TOPO and provides data for the object
– The FDO/TOPO will determine the risk of collision with the object
• Risk can be dependent on uncertainty of the future trajectory due to 
perturbations and maneuvers planned
– If the risk exceeds a certain threshold (“red” or “yellow”), a collision 
avoidance maneuver will be considered
• If risk is below that threshold (“green”), no action will be taken
Conjunction Operations
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• STS-132 Launch Minus 1 Day
– The TOPO receives notification of a space debris conjunction with the ISS
– The Time of Closest Approach (TCA) is ~1 hr after planned Space Shuttle 
docking
– Early calculations show this conjunction is potentially “red” or “yellow”
• The ISS may need to maneuver to keep a safe distance
• The Space Shuttle launch is targeted based on rendezvousing with 
ISS in a predicted position
• If the ISS does not maneuver, the Space Shuttle is also at risk since it 
will be docked to the ISS at the TCA
• With 3 days to the TCA, lots of uncertainty
• Question:  Does the Shuttle launch window or rendezvous plan need to be 
altered to accommodate a potential ISS collision avoidance maneuver?
• Operational challenge:
– TOPO team needs to determine magnitude of maneuver that will create 
safe separation from debris (involves coordination with Russian trajectory 
team)
– FDO team needs to determine if ISS maneuver impacts the rendezvous 
plan and advise on timeline issues
The Challenge: A conjunction with the ISS 
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Space Shuttle / ISS Rendezvous Profile
• Phase angle
• Defined as the angle between shuttle and ISS at orbit insertion
• “Long Phase Angle” – The angle is large and the shuttle has to stay in a 
lower orbit than the ISS in the days before rendezvous in order to catch 
up.  
• “Short Phase Angle” – The angle is small and the shuttle is at nearly the 
ISS altitude in the days before rendezvous
• Phase angle is launch day and time dependent
• Pre-Day of Rendezvous Ground Targeted Burns
• NC-# - Phasing Burns - Performed in the morning and evening of crew 
day.  These burns are targeted to place NC-4 at 40 nmi behind the ISS
• Day of Rendezvous Ground Targeted Burns
• NH – Height Adjust – Only required on Long Phase Angle days to raise the 
orbit to just below ISS altitude
• NC-4 – Phasing Burn #4 – Last ground targeted burn before the use of 
relative navigation sensors.  Targets a Terminal Initiation (Ti) burn at 8 
nmi behind the ISS
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Space Shuttle / ISS Stable Orbit Rendezvous
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STS-132 / ULF4 Rendezvous
• Long phase angle with a large Day of Rendezvous NH
• NC-3 on Flight Day 2 was the last opportunity to set up phasing rate to arrive 
NC-4 at 40 nmi behind ISS
• Normally the ISS decision point for a go/no go for a collision avoidance 
maneuver would have occurred after NC-3.  Coordination between the two 
teams moved the decision point to prior to NC-3
• This allows two different NC-3 burn plans for two different ISS positions 
depending on go/no go for collision avoidance maneuver
• Day of Rendezvous NH also gives you flexibility to adjust phasing. 
• In this case, even if NC-3 had been adjusted for one option, and 
decision changed, NH could have been altered 
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STS-132/ULF4 Rendezvous: “What If”
• What if it had been a short phase angle launch day?
• No NH means Day of Rendezvous set up entirely by NC-3
• Small perturbations in the ISS trajectory or Shuttle trajectory after NC-3 
can result in ~20 nmi in dispersion of NC-4 position
• A large perturbation like a collision avoidance burn could make an 
even larger difference resulting in significant extra propellant use or 
even delayed rendezvous
• May not have been enough to make the decision prior to NC-3, but it may 
have been necessary to perform the burn and get post-burn tracking on 
the ISS before targeting NC-3
• Conclusion:  Earlier decision points are required if you have a less flexible 
rendezvous plan
• Could even require re-targeting launch time
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Lessons Learned and Best Practices
• Team coordination
• ISS/TOPO team is able to send burn plan and post-burn ISS state to 
Shuttle/FDO team using a common tool set that allows easy evaluation
• Neither team could work to an independent timeline because they were 
tied to the other team’s decision points
• “Two cooks in the kitchen” – since the conjunction was after docking, it 
was a potential risk to both vehicles, so both teams had to agree on a 
criteria for assessing risk, even though only one vehicle had to maneuver
• Strengths of Shuttle rendezvous profile
• Burn targets need only be provided 30 minutes prior to a maneuver
• This allows real time teams to continuously evaluate changes to the 
plan until the last minute
• Long phase angle rendezvous profiles have NH
• This allows team to adjust day of rendezvous profile as late as 
possible after all other trajectory events are complete
• What happened?
• Updated tracking on Flight Day 2 showed a reduced threat from the object 
and just before NC-3 the team decided to call off the ISS collision 
avoidance burn
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Questions
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